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 Chapter 14 
 The Decision to Move: Being Mobile 
and Being Rational in Comparative 
Anthropological Perspective 
 Thomas  Widlok 
 Small Places, Big Issues 
 Looking at the relationship between rationality and action in the domain of space, 
anthropologists fi rst think of actions such as walking and the related decision to 
move or to stay. Walking may be considered the prototypical human action in a 
spatial setting. Correspondingly, the decision to move is the prototypical challenge 
to human practical reasoning in the context of moving through space. I wish to con-
tribute to the topic of rationality and action by reviewing cases of human mobility 
and human orientation in space in some detail. This chapter is based on ethno-
graphic work I have carried out with various groups of mobile hunters and gatherers 
over the years, particularly in southern Africa and Australia. Do these remote forag-
ers have anything to offer to understanding decisions that matter most in the current 
world (regarding the current refugee and migration crisis, for instance)? I propose 
the following considerations with regard to this question. First, bringing in exam-
ples from far away is a key element in combating the common bias that “there is no 
alternative” (see Widlok,  2009a ). A case study exemplifying a very different mode 
of engaging rationality with action underlines that alternatives always exist and that 
it is worthwhile to spell them out clearly and develop them creatively. Second, the 
forager decision to move occupies the opposite end of the spectrum of human pos-
sibilities in that it focuses on rationality and action in a basic face-to-face setting 
without being confounded by effects of larger institutional frameworks. Third, the 
major global crises always come down to numerous smaller dilemmas and ques-
tions that social agents need to solve and that preoccupy them. For most agents the 
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large issues become problematic only when they translate into everyday decisions 
such as whether or not to relocate. In this chapter I therefore adopt the general 
anthropological strategy of tackling big issues in small places: I study the relation 
between rationality and action as exemplifi ed by foragers in the Namibian bush. 
 Although the decision to move may be thought of as basic, many differences 
between various foraging groups are ignored in this chapter for the sake of the general 
argument. One uniting feature of forager mobility stands out from the diversity of 
cases, climatic zones, and points in time: All foragers clearly have more than just eco-
logical reasons for relocating. Granted, when social agents justify a relocation they 
often mention environmental factors, especially the accumulating dirt at a certain place 
and the anticipated ripening of a desired fruit at another, distant place, but a variety of 
motives can lead individuals or groups to pick up and move. Ethnographic evidence 
leaves no doubt that reference to environmental conditions is in fact usually a pretext 
to cover up either actual or imminent social confl ict that people want to escape or pre-
vent (Kent,  1989 ; Widlok,  1999 ). Moving is the main strategy for solving disputes. 
When ill-feelings or social tensions occur in these societies, the dominant strategy is to 
split up and move apart. Hence, there are many more moves than the natural environ-
ment alone necessitates. Even in situations where people are more or less settled, they 
move their hut within the settlement for purposes of dispute resolution, altering spatial 
closeness and distance in order to manage  social closeness and distance. Out of 89 huts 
in a settlement that I stayed in, less than 18 % remained in the same place in the course 
of a single year (Widlok,  1999 , p. 10). The challenge is to understand this mobility and 
these decisions to move, to place them in the larger framework about theories connect-
ing rationality and action. What is the rationality behind these moves? Is it a special 
kind of rationality geared specifi cally to the action at hand? What general lessons 
about the social embeddedness of decision-making can be drawn? 
 State of the Art: Rational Choice Models of Mobility 
 The mobility of hunter-gatherers is not a new fi eld, so this chapter begins with a 
brief review of some of the existing anthropological models so as to prepare the 
ground for my theoretical argument. Probably the best known anthropological 
model in this respect is optimal foraging theory (Martin,  1983 ). It is particularly 
interesting because its application has not been limited to living hunters and gather-
ers but broadened to cover human behavior more generally. For instance, this theory 
has served to model human behavior in western-style museum exhibitions (Rounds, 
 2004 ). The assumption is that visitors to an exhibition optimize their visit by match-
ing elements of high-interest value with low search costs and that there are some 
do’s and don’ts that result in rules for deciding how long and in what order one 
should view the items at an exhibition. These rules (search rules, attention rules, 
quitting rules) are aimed not at the best possible solution but at one that is satisfac-
tory given the environment as it is (p. 404). 
 The original version of optimal foraging theory consists of theorems intended to 
explain when and how foragers move from one resource to another (see Kelly,  1995 , 
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for an overview). For example, the theorem of diminishing returns, a central feature 
of optimal foraging theory, holds that staying in a given patch, say a grove or a small 
forest of nut trees that foragers exploit, requires increasing work in the form of 
walking to nut trees that are ever further away within the patch. At a certain point 
the additional work generates ever fewer returns. The rational choice solution to the 
problem, namely, moving camp to another grove, is an initial extra investment, but 
there is a point at which that investment is compensated for by the decreasing returns 
of the original patch. On the basis of several assumptions about caloric requirements 
and caloric expenditure (Kelly,  1995 , pp. 133–134), the optimal foraging theory 
predicts that hunter-gatherers will make a move to another patch when a one-way 
foraging distance reaches 3 km (1.9 miles) on average. This calculation matches 
what many reports say about the way in which foragers move. Foragers do not stay 
in a forest until the last nut has been consumed. They walk off much earlier, and the 
model can show that this strategy complies with rationality in terms of getting the 
best deal given a number of available patches. When the gathering of the same 
amount of nuts requires ever more effort, the point at which foragers will leave a 
given patch of resources will be earlier than the point at which approaching starva-
tion would necessitate a move. Optimal foraging theory also goes beyond this sce-
nario, for it takes into account more complicated ones as well. Indeed it must 
because many factors are involved (e.g., the number of foragers, the size of a group 
that shares foraging returns, the variety of storage possibilities, increases or 
decreases in the desired quantity to forage, and the nature of what is foraged). One 
could even say that it will eventually be very diffi cult to disentangle causes and 
effects in such a model. What appears to be a given patch may turn out to be the 
variable outcomes of a combined set of practices. 
 According to optimal foraging theory, forager movements are rational because 
they follow calculable thresholds. Of course, foragers do not perform this calcula-
tion abstractly with graphs. Instead, they are driven by the logic inherent in the 
environmental conditions and the ways in which human exploitation interacts with 
these conditions. Other proximate reasons, such as social tensions, may also be 
considered, but they are thought to boil down to the  ultimate causes inherent in the 
logic of resource exploitation (Kelly,  1995 , p. 140). In other words, in this model 
rationality (as exhibited in the way foragers use scarce resources) is completely 
contained in the environmental action and ultimately dictated by environmental 
conditions. It is still a sort of rationality but one that mandates certain cultural prac-
tices by ecological necessity instead of being mandated by cultural rules. 
 Nonetheless, caution is needed to avoid succumbing to the “fallacy of the rule” 
(Bourdieu,  1977 , p. 29), which establishes a likely outcome and reinstills it in the 
minds of the agents as something that has caused the outcome. Optimal foraging 
theory exemplifi es a strongly deductive notion of rationality. It is usually seen as 
adhering a strict, nomothetic, deductive approach. The conditions of a patch and the 
characteristics of the forager group exploiting it (e.g., the number of people and 
their caloric intake) are defi ned as premises allowing one to derive what the rational 
behavior in that situation will be, for that behavior necessarily follows. If real-life 
foragers depart from what is predicted, either they are mistaken (and will eventually 
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die out from maladaptation) or the observers are mistaken in their premises and 
need to adapt the formula (the values making up the graph), but the deductive logic 
of the model at large is not questioned. However, optimal foraging theory may be 
more productive in combination with abductive reasoning (see below). After all, the 
assumption that foragers move (or shall move) after three days  because of the inher-
ent rationality of patch depletion holds only until there are alternative explanations 
that are more plausible. 
 A need for alternative explanations seems evident from a close examination of 
the ethnographic record that describes the life of foraging groups. As formulated in 
a study on Canadian Unuk (Eskimo) hunter-gatherers,
 In the spring…the spirit of impermanence seemed to infect people, so that, from my point 
of view, they seemed to make the maximum rather than the minimum necessary number of 
moves. When the fl ooding river forced us uphill, the retreat was always made foot by foot 
as the river rose. For several days we moved camp at least once a day and sometimes 
oftener, and always when the water had arrived within inches of our doorsteps....It some-
times seemed as though moving—rearranging the environment—were a form of play for 
the Eskimos, a pleasure in itself. Whatever the explanation, I never completely shared the 
Eskimo spirit....Moves were a nuisance that disrupted my work and, worse, shifted my 
world as a kaleidoscope shifts its bits of glass, making me uncomfortably aware of the pat-
tern’s fragility. (Briggs,  1970 , p. 32) 
 This account is but one of the many that have shed doubt on the universal appli-
cability of optimal foraging theory. As pointed out above, residential moves are not 
guided only by subsistence effi ciency. The acquisition of other raw materials or the 
attraction of other places may also be important (e.g., for fi nding a spouse or for 
joining a ritual). A place’s adverse conditions (e.g., a plague of insects) may be a 
crucial factor, too. All these aspects are possible social motivations for residential 
moves (Kelly,  1995 , p. 147). The model of diminishing returns is not a  law of dimin-
ishing returns. One cannot assume (or deduce) that moves are  ultimately due to 
foraging effi ciency. It is possible only to abduct that this foraging effi ciency for food 
resources is a factor that is part of the rationality at work, more in some cases and 
less in others. The implication is not, however, that the aforementioned Unuk 
Eskimos (and the other known groups) are acting irrationally. Should one assume 
instead that they have a kind of primitive rationality, now politically more correctly 
called a forager mode of thought? What else may lie behind formulations such as 
“spirit of impermanence” or “the Eskimo spirit” in the quotation above? 
 State of the Art: Decision-Making Probability 
 Most anthropologists studying hunter-gatherers have explored this relativistic alter-
native by trying to come as close as possible to achieving what is usually called the 
 emic view. It is the approach of basing descriptions of the decision-making process 
on locally defi ned criteria, taking the decision-makers to be the experts, and allow-
ing that the rationality of the agents may be very different from that of the observer. 
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One can try to systematically adopt the emic view by drawing on ethnographic deci-
sion tree modeling (Gladwin,  1989 ). The textbook example for this theory is not one 
of foragers but rather of American college students and the question of whether or 
not they go to have lunch at McDonald’s. The technique is that one tries through 
interviews to elicit as many criteria as possible that are said to be relevant for this 
decision to go or not to go (criteria such as whether one likes the food, likes the 
service, knows where a McDonald’s is). Then the criteria are sorted according to a 
decision-making tree, which is subsequently tested against the decisions that the 
college students actually report when being asked where they have lunch. That is, 
the model should account for most of the decisions observable in real life. Failure to 
do so would indicate that a criterion is either missing from or misplaced in the 
decision-making tree. As a product of inductive reasoning, the tree makes predic-
tions on the basis of probability and takes account of local values and decision- 
making criteria. If some of the decision-making tree’s underlying criteria and values 
are subject to change (e.g., with age), decision-making trees will likely differ from 
one cultural or subcultural group to the next. One can thereby test and substantiate 
a relativistic hypothesis through the inductive reasoning of probability. 
 Again, this model of ethnographic decision trees works well in some instances. 
It apparently holds in particular for small-scale farmers and their choices of which 
crop to grow and when. Stated differently, it seems to work in settings of small 
homogeneous groups with decisions of seasonal regularity. It does not work as 
nicely with foragers, however, as I found when trying to employ this method with 
San (“Bushmen”) in Namibia. The individuals there are not homogenous in their 
responses, and it seems that the decision to move camp is not considered an instance 
that can be looked at through the lens of probability but rather only in personal 
terms as it were. The question that I asked in my fi eld research was not about going 
to McDonald’s (Namibia being one of the world’s few countries without 
McDonald’s). Instead, I asked what locals thought about attending secondary 
school, which for them means moving away from home, attending boarding school, 
or staying with distant family. There was no problem in eliciting an ethnographic 
decision tree. Everyone agreed that secondary education was important and that 
children should take this opportunity if they had found someone to pay their fees, 
buy them a school uniform, and offer them a place to stay. There was also agreement 
that discrimination by teachers or fellow students, food shortage at the place one 
was staying, or similar problems should not be permitted to make the children quit 
school. Despite this consensus, however, individuals constantly, and often for highly 
idiosyncratic reasons, deviated from the outcome predicted by the model. 
 It emerged in this research that the social agents concerned refused to see major 
personal choices (such as moving away from home to attend school) as decisions to 
be taken from a perspective of nowhere in particular. The agent was not regarded as 
replaceable by anyone else. There was no notion of “all things being equal,” which 
would have allowed for a neutral weighing of alternatives. This personalization of 
decisions applied to the manner in which the agent is perceived, the fact that a deci-
sion is seen to be analogue rather than digital, and the degree to which individual 
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decisions are seen as incongruent with those of others. In the following paragraphs 
I examine these aspects in more detail. 
 First, the San place a high social premium on allowing individuals to make their 
own decisions, and this applies to children from an early age. Parents leave it to their 
children to choose whether or not to go to school. The teachers, who are exclusively 
from other ethnic groups with a farming background, tend to be outraged about this 
practice and shake their heads. When they go to see the parents to ask them why a 
child has run away from school or did not attend, the parents would usually respond, 
“Go and ask the child. She [He] is sitting right here.” Whereas the teachers feel that 
the parents have a duty to make their children go to school (and that the children 
have a duty to obey their parents), San parents and children see it as a matter of 
personal autonomy for the pupil to decide. Even if one is generally in favor of 
schooling, this preference is trumped by the self-determination of the individual for 
his or her own life. 
 Second, San parents and children alike strongly emphasize the need to be able to 
revise decisions. Decisions are made as one goes; they are not thought of as on/off 
switches or inexorable if-then mechanisms. This characteristic, too, clearly surfaces 
in intercultural contact when understanding breaks down. Employers (and anthro-
pologists for that matter) who think they have struck a medium- or long-term agree-
ment that, for example, obliges local people to produce tools in exchange for money 
or to attend school for an extended period are constantly frustrated. The local people 
often decide to abandon the plan or their cooperation halfway through, even if it 
means that they do not receive the money or diploma they had originally envisioned. 
This frustration by outsiders has been translated into a stereotype casting San peo-
ple as unreliable and unstable. From a San perspective, however, it is a consequence 
of avoiding decisions that cannot be revised in the light of new information and 
events. They do not wish to make a decision once and for all at the beginning of an 
action but rather only once the action has been completed. 
 Third, social agents in the San cultural settings seem to be aware at all stages of 
the decision-making process that they are living only that one life and that decisions 
such as splitting up or joining up again are not repetitions of one another, although 
they may occur frequently. In discussions of past or future decisions, there is a pre-
occupation with particulars. Even if everyone has agreed in principle on the criteria 
for a sound decision on schooling, for instance, the underlying assumption is that 
one small thing can be suffi cient to allow the shared hierarchy of criteria to topple. 
A minor thing of this sort could be, for instance, a brief exchange of words with a 
teacher or another student, some insult, or some minor problem with food. What 
seem to be excuses to the outside, such as the fact that one had no soap with which 
to wash, no shoes to wear, or no decent food that morning, are acceptable contingen-
cies that distinguish one decision from another. Just as personal lives are ultimately 
unique because they are subject to particular differences, so are individual decision- 
making processes (see, Widlok,  2009b , for a discussion of moral decision-making). 
Decisions may be faulty with respect to principles but comprehensible and justifi -
able in terms of the particulars. 
T. Widlok
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 Given the high premium on individual autonomy, a stance representing a proba-
bilistic model of reasoning becomes inimical to understanding the personal and 
situational aspects of the decisions in this ethnographic case. Arguably, the decision 
to move is felt to be a personal, not a rational, one if the term  rational decision is 
understood to mean a choice arrived at from no particular perspective that allows 
one to weigh aims and means in a detached manner. By contrast, the default assump-
tion is that the decision to move is made at a particular time by a particular person 
in a particular evolving setting. I thus realized that there would always be cases 
unaccounted for by any of these decision-making trees despite a degree of agree-
ment on the criteria for the decision to move from one location to another. In prac-
tice the predictive value of these tree models is precarious: Because of everyday 
life’s imponderabilia, decision-makers in these settings are ready to reconsider their 
decision at any time. These decisions are seen as uniquely affecting personal lives, 
so people refuse to judge them aloofl y as being instances of a general type. Instead, 
they highlight the personal, ultimately unique setting. A calculus of probability does 
not work, for the underlying presupposition of such a calculus is that one such deci-
sion is interchangeable with other decisions of the same type and that the two alter-
natives can be weighed against each another. However, one should be cautious to 
treat this observation as evidence of the rare or exotic nature of decision-making in 
this particular group of foragers. In fact, many observations in modern western set-
tings also fi t the description of personalized decisions (Fuchs,  2008 , p. 342), espe-
cially when considering fundamental, irreversible decisions of one’s life that do not 
comply with ideas of stock-taking (Spaemann,  1996 , p. 126). 
 The Pragmatics of Decision-Making 
 At this juncture I take the opportunity to recapitulate the two models presented so 
far for understanding forager mobility. Optimal foraging theory is generally used as 
a deductive model that underlines the necessity to move, that is, the assumed exi-
gencies that ultimately dictate the decisions that foragers make. Ethnographic deci-
sion tree modeling, by contrast, has been employed primarily to generate inductively 
whatever local models of decision-making may exist to offer agents (and observers) 
probable outcomes and probable criteria that constitute a decision-making process. 
Optimal foraging theory, one could say, links all rationality to outcomes, whereas 
ethnographic decision trees separate out different rationalities and their resulting 
actions. I have suggested that neither of these models can fully account for the eth-
nographic evidence of forager mobility. There appear to be patterns in the ethnogra-
phy, but the arguments involved are neither those of necessity nor of probability but 
rather of  plausibility . 
 The need is for a less problematic model that links rationality and action in a 
procedural view of rationality. I suggest going beyond the traditional models of 
strict deductive or inductive logic, strict in the sense that they claim truth outside the 
conversations and interactions that unfold in the social context of the reasoning in 
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question. As a fi rst step it is important to have an idea of what the social context 
looks like in this case. 
 Decision-making in a forager group such as the San of Namibia does not follow 
quasi-legal or rigid procedures. Instead, participants and observers alike can derive 
decisions only from the continuous discourse that allows them to make decisions 
based on plausibility. Their conversational and interactional style is a particular one 
of repetitions, overlaps, and echoing in everyday talk. Consensus is achieved as the 
interlocutors repeat and echo some opinions or arguments and leave out others. This 
kind of exchange enables people to make intelligent guesses about what they and 
others will be doing next. The strategy requires that everyone be allowed to join in 
the conversation while avoiding prominence (and exposure) as an individual voice 
of authority. Similar strategies for achieving consensus have been observed else-
where, as in Aboriginal Australia (Liberman,  1985 , p. 104). Taken together, they 
differ not only from the dominant western-style conversation and interaction but 
also from the aggressive and self-assertive style found in many societies, including 
“Big Man societies” in Melanesia or segmentary systems in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 The following excerpt is one of the best known examples from the !Kung San, 
who are neighbors of the Hai//om San with whom I have worked and who have a 
similar interactional practice of overlapping and echoing talk: “‘Yesterday,’ ‘eh,’ ‘at 
Deboragu,’ ‘eh,’ ‘I saw old/Gaishay.’ ‘You saw old/Gaishay.’ ‘eh, eh.’ ‘He said that 
he had seen the great python under the bank.’ ‘EH!’ ‘The python!’ ‘He wants us,’ 
‘eh, eh, eh,’ ‘to help him catch it’” (Marshall,  1976 , p. 290). 
 Among the San, people often talk in parallel, and there is no formal conclusion 
to this talk. Instead, it is made up largely of “topographical gossip” which invokes 
places and movements but without any formal decisions (Widlok,  1997 , p. 321). 
Apart from this feature of particular conversational forms, the reasoning involved 
allows for unpredictable events in that nonhuman and apparently nonanimate fea-
tures of the environment are expected to come in as well, infl uencing the direction 
that a decision may take. When people in this community refrain from long-term 
planning, it is not that they are incapable of doing so but rather that they allow the 
state of the environment or of other persons to prompt or trigger their decisions at 
certain stages of the process. Detailed studies on the process of tracking animals 
have shown that anticipating and predicting the movement of an animal that one is 
pursuing involves a continuous creation of new hypotheses in the light of new infor-
mation added to the incomplete picture of tracks and other signs on the ground. This 
activity also involves a constant dialogue between trackers who are allowed to 
maintain their diverging views as events unfold (Liebenberg,  1990 , p. 108). Making 
decisions about moving (or indeed any other decision) entails a similar process of 
encouraging heterodoxy in views, keeping the decision open until very late in the 
process and ultimately always allowing individuals to maintain their own diverging 
view. In residential mobility this tolerance of diverging views is facilitated by the 
fact that packing up one’s belongings is easy; it allows for fast and fl exible reactions 
either to join a party that leaves or simply stay put. 
 Having briefl y described the mode of reasoning ethnographically, one may now 
ask whether there is a more general model that can help reintegrate these  observations 
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into a comparative theory on rationality and action. It turns out that the plausibility 
mode of decision-making that has been observed in fi eld research with foragers 
appears to have its counterpart in current strands of the theory of reasoning. More 
specifi cally, the philosophy of science has a growing body of literature by scholars 
seeking to defi ne rationality not as a narrow logical concept based on necessity 
(deductive inference) or probability (inductive inference) but rather as reasoning 
based on plausibility, or what is called abductive inference (see Flach & Kakas, 
 2000 ; Josephson & Josephson,  1994 ; Walton,  2004 ). In other words, there is at least 
a third form of reasoning that is both widespread in everyday decision- making and 
capable of accounting for the complexity of decision-making among mobile 
people. 
 Abduction is the generation of hypotheses based on the evaluation of alternatives 
(Walton,  2004 ). People witnessing a surprising event (e.g., the light going out, for-
agers relocating yet again) creatively seek an explanation that would make sense of 
it, would make it appear to be a matter of course. When the light goes out, one 
works backward as it were, usually fi rst suspecting that the bulb is burned out. If  all 
light bulbs are observed to have gone out, one may plausibly infer that a fuse has 
blown. If the lights are out not just in one’s own house but in all the houses on the 
block, then one may suspect a wider power failure as the cause, and so on. None of 
these inferences is necessary, deductively valid, or probable in a strict sense. There 
are many possible reasons for the light bulb(s) having gone out, and some may have 
the same estimated probability (e.g., burned-out bulbs and blown fuses). What peo-
ple do when reasoning abductively is tap into their background knowledge and 
select the most plausible explanation in a procedural fashion. Given the premium 
that the San place on personal autonomy, a forager of that community is constantly 
prompted to make sense of the sometimes erratic movements of other elements in 
the environment, whether fellow foragers, game animals, or erratic rainfall. The 
decision by the forager to move or stay rests on the background knowledge of per-
sons and places that he or she has encountered. It is a type of reasoning that does not 
follow strict rules of necessity, the regularities of majority rule, or predictable sea-
sonality but emerges by deleting the less plausible alternatives in the course of pro-
tracted social decision-making. Abduction is a way of generating an emerging 
certainty (not truth) that identifi es the least defective alternative given the group’s 
incomplete knowledge. 
 Abduction is, of course, a prevalent form of reasoning. When making sense of 
actions, humans usually combine deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments—
each type of logic having its distinct function (Walton,  2004 , p. 86). They all feature 
in scientifi c explanation, including that in the natural sciences (see Agar,  2013 ). But 
unlike deduction and induction, abduction reminds one that explanation and knowl-
edge formation as a whole are dialogical and procedural. Processes of knowledge 
formation do not follow a fi xed set of linear rules. Selection of the most plausible 
hypothesis is a process of dialogue with both objects that play a role (e.g., bulbs and 
natural processes) but also with other humans with whom one is engaged and who 
may support or doubt one’s hypotheses. 
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 For a long time, abduction was taken to be a defective form of deductive reason-
ing, for it was frequently defi ned as a case of affi rming the consequent (e.g., where 
there is smoke, there must be fi re). The idea of abductive reasoning seems to have 
been marginalized together with everyday cognition (Lave,  1988 ) as exemplifi ed by 
the reasoning of foragers (Liebenberg,  1990 ). But the strength of abductive infer-
ence is evidently not in an isolated statement (a syllogism) but rather in a creative 
and explanatory mode of logical reasoning that establishes the best available 
hypothesis at a certain point in an open, explanatory dialogue that invites additional 
testing and evaluation. In other words, this strength is less likely to show up in 
experimental isolation than in ethnographic cases. Understanding reasoning in pro-
cesses means recognizing that it matters where actors are in a complex decision- 
making process. Abduction is a plausible short-cut, especially in the early stages of 
trying to make sense of a situation or an action. But there may be situations (e.g., the 
tracking of animals) in which it is useful to cultivate this mode of reasoning for as 
long as possible in the problem-solving process. Similarly, I argue that this mode of 
reasoning is important  throughout many decision-making processes, not just in their 
initial, creative stages. 
 Trying to explain why someone has moved is, I suggest, very much an abductive 
dialogical exercise that entails observation of natural givens (e.g., the distribution of 
resources and the number of people involved) but also interaction with other agents 
with whom one is in constant communication (and whose motivations one may 
abduct if they are not made explicit). Moreover, I suggest that making a rational 
decision on when to move is also a form of abductive reasoning. Determination of 
the best time to move (and the best destination to move to) is typically  not based on 
necessity or probabilistic calculus but rather on broad background knowledge, 
informed guesses as it were, in dialogue with others, and not only fellow human 
beings. Moreover, I suggest that abductive inference can provide an account that 
links reasoning and action into a coherent whole that can also explain cultural varia-
tion. The recognition of cultural variation in abductive reasoning is the fi nal point of 
this chapter. 
 Variation in Reasoning 
 The case material presented in this chapter can enhance a general model of abduc-
tive inference pertaining to dialogical knowledge formation as it emerges in con-
temporary philosophy and logic. An explanation of variation surfaces when one 
realizes that both the type of dialogue through which reasoning takes place and the 
partners with whom it takes place are likely to vary across situations. The prototypi-
cal forms that the dialogue of explanation takes in the philosophical literature are 
those between teacher and student, between judge or prosecutor and witness, and, 
more recently, between a user and an expert system of artifi cial intelligence through 
an interface (Walton,  2004 , p. 88). None of these three examples resembles that of 
a group of foragers determining whether they should move or not.
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•  Forager decision-making on any matter (as exemplifi ed by the San ethnography) 
differs greatly from the typical teacher–student relationship. As Hoymann ( 2010 ) 
reported, asking inquisitive questions is not encouraged among foragers. Young 
people are expected to learn by observing and trying or by being told at the 
appropriate moment, not by prompting adults as in a typical teacher–learner 
situation. 
•  Communal talk among foragers is also very different from the hierarchical set-
ting of court proceedings in that communal talk among foragers has no fi xed 
leadership roles and no clearly delimited sequences or groups of speakers. 
Indeed, their communication makes heterodoxy possible and sometimes even 
encourages it. People in these settings may stick to their decisions and explana-
tions. Because they are supported by others, they also have “the freedom to be 
wrong at times” (Liebenberg,  1990 , p. 162). When hunting, for instance, indi-
viduals may maintain rather different views as to what the tracked animal is 
likely to do next. When it comes to moving camp, anyone may decide not to go 
with the majority, but there are other options, such as being on one’s own or split-
ting up the group. 
•  Expert systems today commonly take the form of multiple digital circuits of yes/
no decisions. Research specifi cally on questions established that San speakers 
have a preference for not posing yes/no questions (Hoymann,  2010 ). In contrast 
to speakers of many other languages, they do not seem not to use requests for 
confi rmation that would press the interlocutor to use yes/no. In contradiction to 
the most typical form of questioning used in expert systems (Widlok,  2008 ), they 
avoid cornering their interlocutors and seem to take care not to infringe the 
autonomy of others. When they draw on the knowledge of others, it seems very 
unlike the process of consulting an expert machine. 
 What the forager cases suggest is that the dialogic nature of reasoning is compat-
ible with a variety of equally competent forms of dialogue: inquisitive, circumspect, 
digital, open, bilateral, multilateral, unilinear, and multistrand. In fact, I argue that 
the different practices of dialogue may produce different forms of reasoning and a 
spectrum of rational outcomes. It is neither one rationality only nor anything goes 
but rather a limited spectrum of possibilities describable in terms of the dialogical 
practices in which reasoning takes place. 
 The form of dialogue is not the only entity that may be broader than what the 
philosophical literature usually covers; the dialoging partners, too, may have a 
wider range. Reasoning is usually thought to take place either in an experimental 
mode between individuals and nature (as in much of the research on infants) or 
among investigating humans pursuing their own individual decision-making strate-
gies. The aforementioned example of light bulbs that had gone out could include 
interaction with objects (e.g., shaking the bulb, checking the fuses) or interaction 
with other subjects (e.g., the neighbors, people in the room, or the electric utilities 
company). The peculiarity of the case about foragers on the move is that the bound-
ary between nature and other persons is drawn in a particular way and differently 
from what nonforagers may expect. Personalization does not necessarily mean that 
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natural objects are treated as persons, although such anthropomorphization occurs 
as well. In many Australian examples, Aborigines do not just talk about the land and 
its features but may address it directly, as when expressing their respect or even their 
pity when the land has not been cared for properly. In Aboriginal Australia, a typical 
indication of a country 1 that has not been cared for is that no one has set fi re to it and 
that it should be visited (see Rose,  1995 ). Cases differ as to what is subject to person-
alization. It could be animals, various supernatural beings, sacred places or—most 
commonly—a combination thereof (as in the Australian case of totemic Dreaming 
beings that involve animals, superhuman creative beings, and places). The main and 
more general point is not that a certain set of beings (animate or inanimate) can fea-
ture as personalized subjects, as partners with whom one may reason. Rather, it seems 
that anything can become personalized if it is treated as a person, by which I mean that 
this  some-thing is taken not as a thing, an instance of a category, but rather as a unique 
subject with which one interacts. By contrast, many phases of decision making in 
present day economics, for instance, entail processes of depersonalization and isola-
tion. The procedures of reasoning are regarded not as a dialogue between persons but 
either as the interaction between users and computational systems or as abstract sys-
temic processes devoid of personal relations, aspirations, and apprehensions. 
 Therefore, both the style of the dialogue and the partners in the dialogue may be 
much more variable than is apparent. Beyond this case of foragers on the move, it 
may be wise to consider procedural rationality broadly enough to allow inclusion of 
variations in how procedures unfold as particular forms of dialogue and how part-
ners in this dialogue are personalized or depersonalized. Rationality would thereby 
cease to be a purely mental phenomenon. Instead, it would reside partially in forms 
of social communication and interaction as well as in features of the environment 
that western philosophy and science tend to discount as irrelevant but that can be 
important triggers or partners in the procedure of reasoning. Why does abductive 
reasoning describe my ethnographic cases so aptly? I do not think its capacity to do 
so is coincidental. Rather, it is because this mode of inference is not a stand-alone 
mode but one that is tied closely to the interacting, corporeal, and relational social 
beings that we humans are. 
 References 
 Agar, M. (2013).  The Lively Science: Remodeling Human Social Research . Minneapolis: Publish 
Green. 
 Bourdieu, P. (1977).  Outline of a theory of practice . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 Briggs, J. L. (1970).  Never in anger: Portrait of an Eskimo family . Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
 Flach, P. A., & Kakas, A. C. (2000). On the relation between abduction and inductive learning. In 
D. M. Gabbay & R. Kruse (Eds.),  Handbook of defeasible reasoning and uncertainty manage-
ment systems (pp. 5–36). Abductive reasoning and learning, Vol. 4. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 Fuchs, T. (2008).  Das Gehirn—ein Beziehungsorgan: Eine phänomenologisch-ökologische 
Konzeption [The brain as a relational organ: A phenomenological-ecological conception]. 
Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 
1  This term is used in Australia to refer to the land belonging to a specifi c Aboriginal group. 
T. Widlok
265
 Gladwin, C. H. (1989).  Ethnographic decision tree modeling . Qualitative Research Methods 
Series: Vol. 19 . Newbury Park: Sage. 
 Hoymann, G. (2010). Questions and responses in ≠Akhoe Hai//om.  Journal of Pragmatics, 42, 
2726–2740. 
 Josephson, J. R., & Josephson, S. G. (1994).  Abductive inference: Computation, philosophy, tech-
nology . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 Kelly, R. L. (1995).  The foraging spectrum: Diversity in hunter-gatherer lifeways . Washington, 
DC: Smithsonian Institution Press. 
 Kent, S. (1989).  Farmers as hunters: The implications of sedentism . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 Lave, J. (1988).  Cognition in practice: Mind, mathematics and culture in everyday life. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 Liberman, K. (1985).  Understanding interaction in central Australia: An ethnomethodological 
study of Australian Aboriginal people . London: Routledge. 
 Liebenberg, L. (1990).  The art of tracking: The origin of science . Claremont: David Philip. 
 Marshall, L. (1976).  The !Kung of Nyae Nyae . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 Martin, J. F. (1983). Optimal foraging theory: A review of some models and their applications. 
 American Anthropologist, 85, 612–629. doi: 10.1525/aa.1983.85.3.02a00060 
 Rose, D. B. (1995).  Country in fl ames: Proceedings of the 1994 Symposium on Biodiversity and Fire 
in North Australia . Canberra: North Australia Research Unit, Australian National University. 
 Rounds, J. (2004). Strategies for the curiosity-driven museum visitor.  Curator, 47, 389–412. 
doi: 10.1111/j.2151-6952.2004.tb00135.x 
 Spaemann, R. (1996).  Personen: Versuche über den Unterschied zwischen “etwas” und “jemand ” 
[Persons: Experiments on the difference between “something” and “somebody”]. Stuttgart: 
Klett-Cotta. 
 Walton, D. (2004).  Abductive reasoning . Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 
 Widlok, T. (1997). Orientation in the wild: The shared cognition of Hai//om Bushpeople.  Journal 
of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 3, 317–332.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/3035022 
 Widlok, T. (1999).  Living on Mangetti: “Bushman” autonomy and Namibian independence. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Widlok, T. (2008). Local experts—expert locals: A comparative perspective on biodiversity and 
environmental knowledge systems in Australia and Namibia. In M. J. Casimir (Ed.),  Culture 
and the changing environment: Uncertainty, cognition and risk management in cross-cultural 
perspective (pp. 351–382). New York: Berghahn. 
 Widlok, T. (2009a).  Van veraf naar dichtbij: The standing of the antipodes in a fl at world . Inaugural 
lecture, Radboud University Nijmegen. Retrieved from  http://repository.ubn.ru.nl/
handle/2066/77162 
 Widlok, T. (2009b). Norm and spontaneity: Elicitation with moral dilemma scenarios. In M. Heintz 
(Ed.),  The anthropology of moralities (pp. 20–45). New York: Berghahn. 
 Open Access  This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, duplica-
tion, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appro-
priate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons 
license and indicate if changes were made. 
 The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in 
the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regu-
lation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce 
the material. 
14 The Decision to Move
